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Since  the  late  1990s,  the  construction  industry  has  undergone  a 
change  in  business  model,   as  contractors  vertically  expand  their 
operations  to  other  parts  of  the  real  estate  life  cycle.  The  question 
arises on  whether construction companies have superior abilities as 
real estate service providers. We have examined the value implications 
of  106  large  merger  and  acquisition  (M&A)  transactions  in  the 
construction  industry  worldwide  from  1986  to  2006.  We  inquire  if  a 
vertical expansion of the construction value chain in the real estate life 
cycle through M&A leads to the creation of shareholder value. We find 
out that this is not the case. M&A success is mainly determined by 
industry-specific size effects and common agency conflicts. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Within the real estate life cycle which covers the development of three phases; 
construction,  operation,  and  liquidation,  construction  can  be  viewed  as  an 
intermediate activity between the development and operation of the real estate 
infrastructure. 
1 The  construction  business  is  characterized  by  very  high 
operational risks, which can only be transferred to a limited extent to investors, 
subcontractors or insurance companies (Flanagan and Norman, 1993).  Despite 
the  significant  amount  of  risk  that  are  being  taken  by  contractors,  which 
exceeds the level of operational risk of many other industries, the sector, in 
particular,  the  contracting  element,  generally  offers  very  low  and 
unpredictable  profit  margins.  The  weak  profitability  is  at  least  partly 
explained by the high degree of fragmentation of the industry which can be 
similarly observed in all important construction markets worldwide, e.g. the 
U.S.,  Japan,  Australia  or  Europe,  causing  stiff  competition  among  the 
contractors.  
 
Ongoing globalization leads to additional competition among contractors, as 
most large construction and infrastructure projects are being commissioned 
across the globe. The aspiration of many contractors to improve their market 
position and overall business  model has led to a strong increase in  global 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in the construction sector over the 
last  15  years  (Rice,  2006).  This  development  is  largely  driven  by  the 
following M&A rationales and strategies: 
 
a)  many contractors have tried to rapidly boost their revenue base through 
acquisitions, as company size is regarded as one of the most important 
indicators  of  competence,  reliability  and  capability  in  construction 
(Delaney and Wamuziri, 2004); 
b)  the  requirement  to  cope  with  the  ongoing  globalization  as  well  as  the 
desire to become less dependent on public spending and the state of the 
economy  in  the  home  market  has  led  to  an  increase  in  cross-border 
transactions; and 
c)  over the last ten years, a further M&A-rationale has boosted M&A activity 
-  the intention of major builders to extend their operations to other parts 
of the real estate life cycle in order to achieve a vertical expansion of the 
construction  value  chain.  Thereby,  contractors  try  to  reduce  their 
dependence on traditional construction and grow their portions of earnings 
generated  from  services  as  these  earnings  are  typically  less  volatile, 
recurrent and carry a higher gross margin (PWC, 2007).  
 
In  the  interest  of  the  shareholders  M&A-transactions  have  –  as  for  any 
strategic management decision – to create shareholder value (Choi and Russel, 
                                                 
1 Rice (2006) employs the concept of a construction value chain (develop → build → 

































2004). A respective commitment has become an integral part of the corporate 
policies outlined in annuals reports in the construction industry throughout the 
world. Cross-industry studies provide evidence that horizontal acquisitions are 
the  most  promising  external  growth  strategy  for  a  company.  In  the 
construction industry, however, recent trends in favor of vertical extensions of 
the value chain into the real estate life cycle challenge this credo. If vertical 
acquisitions are better performing transactions compared to horizontal deals, 
this finding would scrutinize today’s real estate market structure because it 
would be a signal that integrated business models are superior to separated 
market-based solutions. In this light, we will examine whether different kinds 
of M&A-activities initiated by construction companies overall contribute to 
the creation of shareholder value and which kind of acquisition strategy is 
most promising. In contrast to other sectors of the economy, where the wealth 
effects of mergers and acquisitions have been extensively explored, very little 
empirical research has been devoted to the construction industry. Accordingly, 
the  body  of  knowledge  that  concerns  the  circumstances  under  which  a 
potential  bidder  should  pursue  an  M&A  transaction  remains  limited.  To 
extend this knowledge basis, the two objectives of our study are: 
 
  to  document  the  overall  wealth  effects  of  M&A-transactions  in  the 
construction industry from the perspective of the acquirers, the targets and 
their combined entity, and 
  to identify probable success determinants of M&A transactions – like the 
business focus on horizontal or vertical transactions – from the perspective 
of the acquirers. 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  After  having  outlined  the 
objectives of the study, Chapter 2 provides an overview of prior empirical 
research on M&A wealth effects and the deduced research focus of this study. 
Chapter 3 describes the employed methodologies and data sample selection 
criteria. After the description of the data sample, the results for the full data 
sample are presented. Chapter 4 investigates the M&A success determinants 
from  the  perspective  of  the  acquirers  based  on  sub-sample  and  regression 
analyses. Chapter 5 provides a summary and a conclusion. 
 
 
2.  Prior Research 
 
The  capital  market-oriented  way  of  assessing  the  success  of  M&A  is  the 
measurement of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) in the period 
that surrounds the announcement of an M&A transaction through the means 
of an event study. Based on the assumption of efficient capital markets, this 
approach  provides  both  an  objective  and  a  direct  measure  of  the  wealth 
implications on the market value of a firm (MacKinlay, 1997). The evidence 
of event studies about M&A-announcement effects on acquiring and target 


























focus,  but  rather,  exhibit  a  random  sample  of  companies  from  different 
industries (Delaney and Wamuziri, 2004). 
 
With respect to the wealth implications to the shareholders of acquiring firms, 
the studies with a comprehensive industry focus do not exhibit a consistent 
picture:  Malatesta  (1983),  Charlety-Lepers  and  Sassenou  (1994),  Limmack 
and McGregor (1995), Boehmer and  Löffler (1999) as  well as Swanstrom 
(2006) identify negative abnormal returns for the acquirers whilst Firth (1997), 
Pettway and Yamada (1986), Fuller et al. (2002), Georgen and Renneboog 
(2004), Campa und Hernando (2004) as well as Moeller et al. (2005) find 
bidders’  abnormal  returns  to  be  slightly  positive.  Bradley  et  al.  (1983), 
Ruback (1983), as well as Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) report mixed results. In 
most of these studies, the observed abnormal returns for the acquirers turn out 
to be statistically insignificant while the shareholders of the target firms on 
average earn highly positive statistically significant returns (Asquith et al., 
1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrel et al., 1988; Jandik and Makhija, 2005).  
 
The  unequal  distribution  of  merger  gains  between  the  shareholders  of 
acquiring and target firms is an intensively explored phenomenon (Gosh and 
Lee, 2000). Most explanations mainly focus on agency theory and the free-
rider problem in the case of public tender offers. According to the agency 
theory, the disciplinary acquisition of poorly managed targets leads to high 
acquisition gains for the target firm shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Grossmann 
and Hart, 1980; Harrington and Prokob, 1993). 
 
The  existing  empirical  evidence  on  M&A  announcement  effects  in  the 
construction industry is very limited. Delaney and Wamuziri (2004) analyze 
the  wealth  effects  of  M&A  transactions  in  UK  building  materials  and 
construction  industry.  The  documented  findings  show  positive  abnormal 
returns for both the shareholders of the acquirer and the target firm. However, 
the statistical significance of the determined abnormal rates of return has not 
been tested and the sample size is rather small with only 46 acquirers and 33 
targets  which  are  not  separated  in  building  materials  and  the  construction 
industry.  Choi  and  Russel  (2004)  focus  on  the  M&A  wealth  effects  of 
acquirers  in  the  U.S.  construction  industry.  Here,  a  statistically  significant 
CAAR of 3.1% for the bidder companies have been determined.  
 
As an extension to the existing evidence with reference to the construction 
industry, our event study has not been limited to a specific regional market or 
a country-specific derivation of the buyer or target companies. Our focus is 
not only concentrated on intra-industry effects. We are specifically interested 
in extensions of the value chain along the real estate life cycle to understand 
whether  construction  companies  are  superior  real  estate  service  providers. 
Apart from the separate wealth effects of the acquiring and target firms, the 
wealth  effects  of  the  combined  entity  of  acquirer  and  target  firm  are 
additionally analyzed. The success or failure of M&A transactions from the 

































which are derived from the financial literature and expected to deliver further 
insights on how to design successful M&A transactions in the future.  
 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis of the Overall Wealth Effects 
 
3.1  Methodologies 
 
To assess the  wealth effects of M&A transactions, this  study employs the 
event study methodology which relies on the market model based approach by 
following  Dodd  and  Warner  (1983)  and  Brown  and  Warner  (1985).  The 
market model can be stated as follows: 
t j t m j j t j R R , , , *                                           (1) 
The parameters  j   and  j   for each stock j are estimated during a period of 
252  trading  days  prior  to  the  event  window  based  on  an  OLS -regression 
model. The normal returns are calculated based on the estimated parameters 
j  ˆ  and  j  ˆ : 
t M j j t j R ß a R , , ˆ ˆ ˆ                                            (2) 
The  abnormal  return  of  a  stock  j  in  the  event  window  is  calculated  as  the 
difference of the actual ex post stock return  t j R ,  and the normal return of the 
stock  t j R , ˆ : 
t j t j t j R R AR , , , ˆ                                                (3) 
The event window [e1; e2] comprises 41 trading days. It is considered broad 
enough  to  capture  information  leakage,  short-term  underreactions  and 
overreactions  around  the  announcement  days,  and  inaccurate  event  dates. 
According  to  specified  event  windows,  the  cumulated  abnormal  returns 
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Apart from the separate wealth effects for the bidder and target firms, the 
combined wealth effect of the transaction is calculated  by  following the 
suggestion of Houston and Ryngaert (1994) .  An  analysis of the combined 
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with:   MKBidder  = Market capitalization of bidder firm on last trading day of 
estimation period 
MKTarget  = Market capitalization of target firm on last trading day of 
estimation period 
 
To  test  for  significance  of  the  derived  abnormal  and  cumulated  abnormal 
returns,  the  parametric  test  statistic  according  to  Boehmer  et  al.  (1991)  is 
employed  which  is  able  to  account  for  event  induced  changes  in  variance 
(Peterson, 1989). Additionally, we use the approach of Mikkelson and Partch 
(1988) for robustness purposes. To test mean differences, the test statistic used 
by  Hawawini  and  Swari  (1991)  and  Baradwaj  et  al.  (1992)  is  applied.  In 
particular  for  small  sample  sizes,  where  the  assumption  of  normally 
distributed  abnormal  returns  might  be  violated,  the  median-based  non-
parametric Wilxoxon-signed-rank-test is additionally conducted (Corrado and 
Zivney, 1992).  
 
While the basic arguments of the analyses might be considered to be more 
defensible with a long-run performance analysis, long-term studies have some 
shortcomings. In accounting based performance studies, it is very difficult to 
control  for  changes  in  overall  operational  risk  which  can  be  expected  to 
specifically exist in the case of vertical acquisitions. Accounting and capital 
market  based  long-run  studies  both  also  suffer  from  the  problem  of 
confounding events (like serial acquisitions or significant divestments) which 
cannot be excluded or completely controlled for. To offer a clear picture and 
only unbiased effects, we concentrate on short-run analyses. 
 
3.2  Data Sample Selection Criteria 
 
To identify M&A-transactions initiated by construction companies between 
1986  and  2006,  the  M&A  databases  Thomson  One  Banker  Deals  and 
Bloomberg are used. The initial sample consisted of 683 transactions, where 
the bidder firm  was classified as a construction company  according to the 
standard industrial (SIC)-code scheme: 1500s, 1600s, and 1700s. As the SIC-
classifications are partly imprecise or outdated, affiliation to the construction 
industry is verified through separate research, based on the respective annual 
reports and internet presences. For this, the construction industry is defined 
according to the industry classification of the European Union (NACE Code 
45 construction). This division includes general construction and special trade 
construction  for  buildings  and  civil  engineering,  building  installation  and 
building completion. It includes new work, repair, additions and alterations, 
the  erection  of  pre-fabricated  buildings  or  structures  on  the  site  and  also 
constructions  of  a  temporary  nature.  In  contrast  to  the  North  American 

































NACE  Code  45  does  not  include  development  companies.  From  a 
construction value chain perspective, the European industry classification is 
more  focussed,  as  it  solely  includes  pure  construction  activities.  Target 
companies are not restricted to any industry classification, but later organized 
into  subsamples  along  the  construction  industry  value  chain  as  horizontal, 
vertical or lateral transactions. 
 
The final data sample of 106 transactions matches the following criteria: 
1)  the transaction was announced between January 1, 1986 and December 31, 
2006; 
2)  the acquirer belongs to the construction industry in following the NACE 
Code 45; 
3)  both  the  acquirer  and  the  target  firms  were  listed  on  a  public  stock 
exchange for at least 252 trading days prior to the announcement; 
4)  the transaction volume exceeds USD 10 million; 
5)  the transaction has been completed; and 
6)  a change of control has taken place, i.e. the acquirer had less than 50% of 
the outstanding shares prior to the transaction and controlled a majority 
stake after deal completion.  
 
Return data on individual equities and market indices, and information about 
market  capitalization  is  derived  from  Thomson  Financial  Datastream.  For 
market  returns  RM,t  the  capital  weighted  Datastream  Global-Market-
Performance-Index of the respective country of origin is  used. In order to 
assure a satisfactory comparability of additional accounting data (e.g. turnover, 
return on capital employed) the Worldscope database is exclusively used. The 
announcement days are verified through additional press research (e.g. Wall 
Street Journal, Financial Times).  
 
3.3  Descriptive Statistics 
 







































Figure 1  Geographic Distribution of the M&A Transactions 
 
Note: Legend: NA: North America, Rest: Rest of the world, BE: Belgium, CZ: Czech 
Republic, DK: Denmark, GB: Great Britain, GE: Germany, GR: Greece, IT: 
Italy, FR: France, PD: Poland, PO: Portugal, NE: Netherlands, NO: Norway, SP: 
Spain,  SW:  Sweden,  SZ:  Switzerland,  US:  United  States  of  America,  CA: 
Canada, JN: Japan, SK: South Korea, MA: Malaysia, HK: Hong Kong, AU: 
Australia , IN: India. 
 
 
The vast majority of the acquiring firms (93,4%) stem from the triad regions; 
Europe, North America or Asia. The transactions from the rest of the world 
(6,6%)  almost  exclusively  concern  construction  companies  from  Australia. 
Noticeably,  the  North  American,  Asian  and  Australian  construction 
companies have strongly focussed on national acquisitions, whereas one third 
of the deals initiated by European construction companies are cross-border 
transactions.  Approximately  one  fifth  of  the  European  cross-border 
transactions  represent  intercontinental  transactions,  where  the  European 
Bidders 
Targets BE CZ DK  GB  GE  GR IT FR PD  PO  NE  NO  SP SW  SZ US  CA JN SK MA   HK AU  IN Total 
l 
BE  1  1 
CZ  1  1 
DK  1  1 
EE  1  1 
GB  22  1  2  1  26 
GE  1  1 
GR  6  6 
IT  1  1 
FR  1  4  5 
PD  1  1  2  4 
PO  1  1  2 
NE  1  1  2 
NO  1  1  2 
SP  5  5 
SW  1  1  1  3 
SZ  1  1 
US  1  1  2  15  19 
CA  1  1 
JN  11  11 
SK  2  2 
MA   2  2 
HK  1  1 
AU  1  6  7 
IN  1  1 

























































contractors concentrated on the US market. Table 1 provides an overview on 
the yearly development of transaction volume, as well as on the strategic and 
geographical focuses of the acquisitions.  
 
Table 1  Overview  of  Transaction  Volume,  and  Strategic  and 
Geographical Focuses 







1986  3  1  1  1  1  754.9  251.6 
1988  1  0  0  1  0  63.7  63.7 
1990  1  1  0  0  0  31.6  31.6 
1991  1  1  0  0  0  19.5  19.5 
1993  1  0  1  0  0  57.2  57.2 
1996  3  0  1  2  0  513.4  171.1 
1997  5  4  1  0  1  1,468.4  293.7 
1998  8  5  2  1  0  594.2  74.3 
1999  13  7  4  2  5  1,621.6  124.7 
2000  21  16  2  3  8  6,003.7  285.9 
2001  9  7  2  0  0  5,278.9  586.5 
2002  11  7  4  0  2  4,800.4  436.4 
2003  7  4  2  1  3  4,589.5  655.6 
2004  7  0  4  3  0  1,769.1  252.7 
2005  10  7  3  0  0  20,750.4  2,075.0 
2006  5  2  3  0  3  19,072.7  3,814.5 
Total  106  62  30  14  23  67,389.1  - 
 
 
The sample contains 62  horizontal, 30 vertical and 14 lateral transactions. 
Horizontal transactions represent M&A deals within the construction industry. 
Vertical  transactions  constitute  acquisitions  where  a  bidder  from  the 
construction industry extends its value chain forwards or backwards into real 
estate life cycle services, such as planning, development, financing, operation 
and  intermediation  of  real  estate  infrastructure  and  assets.  These  vertical 
transactions  became  more  important  during  the  last  decade  as  Figure  2 
illustrates.  In  lateral  transactions,  the  target  company  is  active  in  industry 
sectors which are unrelated to the construction value chain, for e.g. oil and gas 
exploration, telecommunication or the heavy machinery industry. The sample 
distribution according to the strategic focus is comparable to the distributions 
observed in other construction related M&A-studies. Choi and Russel (2004), 
for  instance,  identify  56.7%  horizontal,  21.1%  vertical  and  22.2%  lateral 
transactions in the United States for the period 1980-2002. 
 
The  total  sample  transaction  volume  amounts  to  USD  67.4  billion.  The 
average  transaction  volume  strongly  increased  in  2005  and  2006.  This 
development is predominantly due to some very large vertical acquisitions, 


























the French motorway operator ASF for USD 16.4 billion by the end of 2005. 
In 2006, the Spanish contractor Ferrovial acquired a 62%-stake in the British 
airport  operator  BAA  for  USD  18.3  billion.  Figure  2  illustrates  the 
development of the number of yearly transactions as well as the proportion of 
vertical transactions. The linear trend component of the proportion of vertical 
transactions clearly indicates that the expansion of service activities through 
M&A acquisitions has strongly increased over the last decade. This trend is 
not  biased  by  single  transactions  with  very  large  transaction  volumes,  but 
based on the number of completed M&A-transactions. 
 
Figure 2  Development of the Number of Transactions and Percentage 
of Vertical Transactions 
 
 
Table 2 provides an overview on turnover and profitability of the transaction 
partners.  The  average  turnover  of  the  bidder  companies  is  more  than  four 
times  the  average  target  turnover  (relative  target  size:  23%).  The  relative 
profitability of the target to the acquirer firms is expressed by the return on 
equity  (ROE)  and  return  on  capital  employed  (ROCE)  ratios.  Both  ratios 
indicate that acquirers are more profitable and more efficient than target firms. 
 
The  minima  of  both  ratios  also  documents  that  the  sample  contains  both 
acquirers  and  targets  which  incurred  operational  losses  in  the  year  that 
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Table 2  Overview on  Turnover, ROE and  ROCE of  Acquirers and 
Targets 
Characteristics  Acquirers  Targets  Ratio Target/Acquirer 
Turnover in USD .000       
  Average  3,482,352  791,325  0.227 
  Median  1,590,798  362,733  0.228 
  Standard deviation  4,039,379  1,297,387   
  Min   44,303  9,564   
  Max  26,633,347  8,397,951   
Return on Equity 
a       
  Average  13.8%  9.1%  0.660 
  Median  14.5%  9.6%  0.657 
  Standard deviation  10.5%  8.6%   
  Min   -19.0%  -21.7%   
  Max  44.9%  26.7%   
Return on Capital Employed 
b     
  Average  16.1%  12.2%  0.759 
  Median  15.0%  12.4%  0.831 
  Standard deviation  12.9%  21.9%   
  Min   -20.6%  -17.0%   
  Max  61.0%  43.2%   
Note: a: ROE is calculated as the ratio of net income after minorities and total equity 
including retained earnings as of December 31 of the financial year prior to the 
acquisition announcement. b: ROCE is calculated as the ratio of EBITDA and 
Capital Employed.  
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4.  Empirical Results  
 
On  average,  bidders  from  the  construction  industry  realized  small  but 
significant  increases  in  market  value  while  targets  experienced  a  highly 
positive revaluation. Figure 3 illustrates the CAARs for the targets, acquirers 
and combined entity for the entire sample. 
 
As documented in Table 3, the shareholders of the target firms earn highly 
significant and highly positive CAARs in all event windows considered.  
 




CAAR  Z-Value  Median  W-




[-20;+20]  4.40%  3.114***  2.55%  5.688***  -30.48%  38.65%  62.26%  89.82 
[-10;+10]  3.72%  3.842***  3.84%  6.056***  -24.17%  30.03%  65.09%  74.03 
[-5;+5]  3.04%  3.883***  2.08%  6.036***  -16.08%  27.74%  65.09%  56.17 
[-1;+1]  3.32%  3.940***  2.16%  6.992***  -12.73%  28.43%  73.58%  47.07 
Note: This table summarizes the averages and medians of the CARs of 106 quoted 
target firms world wide, which have been acquired by a construction company in 
the period from 1986 to 2006. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance to 
the 10%, 5% and 1%-levels, respectively. Positive expresses the percentage of 
firms  with  positive  CARs  in  the  sample.  The  value  variation  (∆  Value)  is 
calculated as the mean of the products of the respective market capitalization 
prior  to  the  event  window  [-20;  +20]  and  the  respective  cumulated  average 
abnormal return of the sample firms. 
 
 
The  CAARs  for  event  window  [-1;  +1]  amount  to  13.5%  and  gradually 
increase to 21% for [-20; +20]. We interpret this moderate and hardly volatile 
performance  during  the  first  four  weeks  after  the  announcement  as  an 
indicator  that  investor  reactions  are  not  influenced  by  short-term 
misevaluations. Consistent with the results of former evidence, approximately 
one third of the value creation is applicable to the period [-20;-1] prior to the 
official announcement of the M&A transaction. This run-up can be explained 
by  merger  speculation  of  market  participants,  information  leakage  and 
advanced share purchases of the acquirer prior to the official announcement of 
the deal.  
 
The absolute, average wealth creation for the target shareholders sums up to 
USD  44.2  million  over  the  entire  event  window  of  41  days.  From  the 
perspective  of  these  shareholders,  M&A  transactions  are  thus  on  average, 
significantly  value-enhancing.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  evidence  of 
prior studies in the construction industry reported by Delaney and Wamuziri 
(2004) who find CAARs for event period [-20; +20] in the range of 20.9% to 
23.3% for targets in the UK.  

































Table 4 documents that the shareholders of the acquirers also gain slightly 
positive abnormal returns.  
 




CAAR  Z-Value  Median  W-




[-20;+20]  1.35%  0.729  1.20%  4.411***  -33.80%  41.02%  53.77%  45.59 
[-10;+10]  0.78%  0.863  0.99%  4.566***  -33.43%  21.87%  54.72%  33.06 
[-5;+5]  0.26%  0.130  0.25%  4.093***  -29.11%  30.18%  51.89%  18.92 
[-1;+1]  0.84%  1.166  0.60%  5.152***  -26.86%  27.46%  58.49%  17.10 
Note: This table summarizes the averages and medians of the CARs of 106 quoted 
acquirer  firms  in  the  construction  industry  world  wide,  which  carried  out  a 
M&A  transaction  in  the period from  1986 to 2006.  *,  **,  ***  indicates  the 
statistical  significance  to  the  10%,  5%  and 1%-levels.  Positive expresses the 
percentage of firms with positive CARs in the sample. The value variation (∆ 
Value)  is  calculated  as  the  mean  of  the  products  of  the  respective  market 
capitalization prior to the event window [-20; +20] and the respective cumulated 
average abnormal return of the sample firms. 
 
 
The magnitude of the identified CAARs for the acquirers is limited and only 
the  Wilcoxon-test  indicates  the  existence  of  significantly  positive  CAARs. 
The absolute, average wealth creation for the bidder shareholders amounts to 
USD 45.6 million for [-20; +20] and is thus comparable in size to the average 
wealth creation of the target shareholders.  
 
As the CAR of the acquirer and target companies are weighted according to 
their  market  capitalization,  the  combined  CAR  of  an  M&A  transaction  is 
determined. 
 








[-20;+20]  4.40%  3.114***  2.55%  5.688***  -30.48% 38.65%  62.26%  89.82 
[-10;+10]  3.72%  3.842***  3.84%  6.056***  -24.17% 30.03%  65.09%  74.03 
[-5;+5]  3.04%  3.883***  2.08%  6.036***  -16.08% 27.74%  65.09%  56.17 
[-1;+1]  3.32%  3.940***  2.16%  6.992***  -12.73% 28.43%  73.58%  47.07 
Note: This table summarizes the averages and medians of the CAR of 106 combined 
entities  in  the  construction  industry  world  wide,  which  were  involved  in  an 
M&A  transaction  in  the period from  1986 to 2006.  *,  **,  ***  indicates  the 
statistical  significance  to  the  10%,  5%  and 1%-levels.  Positive expresses the 
percentage of firms with a positive CAR in the sample. The value variation (∆ 
Value)  is  calculated  as  the  mean  of  the  products  of  the  respective  market 
capitalization prior to the event window [-20; +20] and the respective cumulated 
average abnormal return of the sample firms. 



























Over all event windows observed, the combined CAARs range between 3.0 
and 4.4%. More than 60% of all transactions are positively evaluated by the 
capital markets. Both the mean test according to Boehmer et al. (1991) and the 
Wilcoxon-test of the medians lead to highly significant results. The combined 
wealth  effects  have  not  yet  been  analyzed  by  any  other  event  study  with 
reference to the construction industry. The majority of cross-industry event 
studies also show significant positive CAARs for the combined entity. This is 
interpreted as a strong indication for the existence of synergy and efficiency 
potentials exploitable by M&A transactions (Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin 
2003).  
 
In the following, the robustness of the present results is tested for various sub-
samples  to  illustrate  how  the  time  period  of  the  acquisition,  geographical 
origin  of  the  acquirer,  and  activity  focus  of  the  transaction  influence  the 
overall success of M&A transactions in the construction industry. 
 
a)  Sub-samples According to the Time Period 
Table 6 outlines the sub-sample analysis results according to the time period. 
 
The entire period under consideration of 21 years has been divided into three 
sub-periods of seven years. In each of the time periods, the target shareholders 
gain highly significant positive abnormal CAARs. With exception of the first 
period  1986-1992,  between  50%  and  60%  of  all  transactions  are  also 
positively viewed from the acquirer’s perspective.  
 
b)  Sub-samples According to the Geographic Origin of the Acquirers 
To examine the importance of the acquirer’s geographic origin, we build three 
sub-samples according to their affiliation in one of the three triad regions of 
Asia, Europe, and North America. With a total of 66 M&A transactions, the 
European  acquirers  represent  the  largest  subsample.  Table  7  outlines  the 
market reactions depending on the geographic origin. 
 
Again, irrespective of the geographic origin of the acquirers, the shareholders 
of  target  firms  earn  highly  significant  positive  CAARs.  Whereas  the  sub-
samples for Europe and Asia are very similar, the CAARs for targets located 
in North America are considerably higher. Only for European acquirers, at 
least  the  medians  of  the  CAARs  indicate  significantly  positive  market 
reactions to the acquisition announcements. However, as all other acquirer 
subsample  CAARs  remain  insignificant,  we  interpret  this  finding  as  an 
indication that the geographic origin is not vale relevant for M&A transactions 
in the construction industry.  

































        1986-1992  1993-1999  2000-2006 
        N=6          N=30                 N=70        
Targets         
Event window  CAAR  Median  Positive  CAAR  Median  Positive  CAAR  Median  Positive 
[-20;+20]  35.32% ***  37.09% **  100.00%  26.54% ***  24.99% ***  93.33%  17.37% ***  12.45% ***  77.14% 
[-10;+10]  32.97% ***  32.67% **  100.00%  17.99% ***  17.70% ***  83.33%  16.61% ***  10.91% ***  80.00% 
[-5;+5]  30.12% ***  32.56% **  100.00%  16.51% ***  14.69% ***  83.33%  13.66% ***  9.89% ***  75.71% 
[-1;+1]  18.54% ***  15.46% **  100.00%  12.50% ***  6.27% ***  83.33%  13.48% ***  7.27% ***  85.71% 
Acquirers                                         
Event window  CAAR  Median  Positive  CAAR  Median  Positive  CAAR  Median  Positive 
[-20;+20]  -6.02%   -5.80%   33.33%  2.60%   2.33% *  60.00%  1.45%   1.08% **  52.86% 
[-10;+10]  -6.47%   -5.14%   16.67%  -0.15%   0.95%   56.67%  1.18%   1.75% ***  57.14% 
[-5;+5]  -5.52%   -3.29%   33.33%  0.81%   0.18%   50.00%  0.35%   0.39% **  54.29% 
[-1;+1]  -3.92%     -2.26%     33.33%  2.21%     0.56% *  60.00%  0.43%     0.63% ***  60.00% 
Combined Entity                                     
Event window  CAAR  Median  Positive  CAAR  Median  Positive  CAAR  Median  Positive 
[-20;+20]  4.45%   4.00%   66.67%  5.04% ***  6.29% **  66.67%  4.12% *  1.49% ***  60.00% 
[-10;+10]  3.49% *  4.00% *  83.33%  2.35% ***  4.76% **  63.33%  4.32% ***  3.39% ***  64.29% 
[-5;+5]  4.24% **  4.73%   66.67%  2.89% ***  1.74% **  63.33%  3.00% ***  2.08% ***  65.71% 
[-1;+1]  2.38% ***  1.91%     66.67%  3.89% ***  2.07% ***  76.67%  3.15% ***  2.16% ***  72.86% 
Note: This table summarizes the averages and medians of the CAR of 106 targets, acquirers and combined entities in the construction industry world 
wide, which were involved in an M&A transaction in the period from 1986 to 2006. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance to the 10%, 
5% and 1%-levels. Positive expresses the percentage of firms with a positive CAR in the sample. 
 
Table 6  Overview of Subsample Results for Various Time Periods 


























        Europe  North America  Asia 
        N=66          N=17                  N=16         
Targets         
Event window  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive 
[-20;+20]  19.89% ***  17.03% ***  81.82%  32.20% ***  26.55% *  94.12%  17.25% ***  14.63% *  81.25% 
[-10;+10]  17.55% ***  13.44% ***  80.30%  32.37% ***  23.02% *  94.12%  14.23% ***  6.54% *  81.25% 
[-5;+5]  14.81% ***  10.81% ***  77.27%  33.85% ***  25.09% *  94.12%  8.73% ***  3.44%   68.75% 
[-1;+1]  14.26% ***  7.27% ***  83.33%  25.65% ***  13.64% *  94.12%  7.91% ***  5.73% *  81.25% 
Acquirers                                       
Event window  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive 
[-20;+20]  1.86%   0.88% ***  51.52%  3.31%   9.67%   58.82%  1.86%   3.75%   62.50% 
[-10;+10]  0.41%   1.03% ***  56.06%  2.58%   5.05%   58.82%  1.62%   1.75%   56.25% 
[-5;+5]  0.02%   0.48% ***  53.73%  0.68%   0.72%   52.94%  1.21%   -0.55%   43.75% 
[-1;+1]  0.52%     0.54% ***  57.58%  -1.49%     -2.02%    41.18%  3.75%     1.21%    75.00% 
Combined Entity                                   
Event window  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive 
[-20;+20]  4.34% **  1.59% ***  63.64%  9.64% **  11.29%   70.59%  3.49%   1.76%   56.25% 
[-10;+10]  3.02% ***  3.84% ***  65.15%  8.89% **  8.32% *  82.35%  3.25%   1.01%   50.00% 
[-5;+5]  2.23% ***  1.53% ***  62.12%  8.32% **  6.40% *  88.24%  2.04%   -0.22%   50.00% 
[-1;+1]  2.63% ***  1.91% ***  75.76%  5.07%     4.73%    64.71%  4.60% *  2.21%    75.00% 
Note: This table summarizes the averages and medians of the CAR of 99 targets, acquirers and combined entities in the construction industry world 
wide, which were involved in an M&A transaction in the period from 1986 to 2006. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance to the 10%, 
5% and 1%-levels. Positive expresses the percentage of firms with a positive CAR in the sample. 
 

































c)  Sub-samples According to the Business Focus 
Table 8 presents, as a first indicator for our main question of interest, the 
subsample results according to the activity focus of the M&A transactions. 
Again, target shareholders gain highly significant abnormal returns. However, 
divergences  between  horizontal  acquisition  targets  and  targets  that  cover 
earlier  or  later  parts  of  the  real  estate  life  cycle  remain  statistically 
insignificant.  
 
The first wealth impressions of the business focus for the shareholders of the 
acquirer  firms  are  ambiguous.  All  mean  CAARs  remain  statistically 
insignificant  while  some  median  values  indicate  negative  returns  for 
horizontal and lateral deals, and positive value effects for vertical acquisitions. 
Mean  difference  tests,  however,  give  no  indication  that  acquirer  returns 
deviate between acquirers with different business focuses. 
For  the  combined  entity  of  acquirers  and  targets,  horizontal  and  vertical 
transactions lead to a significant creation of shareholder wealth while lateral 
transactions show no value implications.  
 
 
5.  Determinants of Successful M&A Transactions from the  
Perspective of the Acquirers 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the determinants that influence the 
success of M&A transactions in the construction industry from the perspective 
of the acquiring companies and specifically, the value potential of vertical 
acquisitions,  further  explanatory  variables  that  represent  potential  success 
determinants  will  be  introduced.  In  the  following,  these  determinants  are 
categorized  into  strategy,  selection,  financing  and  payment  related 
determinants. Table 9 summarizes the determinants and respective explanatory 
variables  employed.  Beyond  the  reported  variables,  we  also  examine  the 
influence  of  the  growth  focus,  relative  ROE,  and  market  valuation  of  the 
target  firm.  As  these  examinations  resulted  in  consistently  insignificant 
findings, we do not report them here. 
 
(D1) Activity Focus 
According to the monopoly theory, horizontal acquisitions are carried out in 
order  to  increase  market  power.  Due  to  the  high  fragmentation  of  the 
construction  industry  worldwide  and  the  global  competition  on  large 
construction and infrastructure projects, the attainment of a dominant market 
position  by  one  single  contractor  seems  questionable.  Size  is  nevertheless 
considered  as  one  of  the  most  critical  success  factors  in  the  construction 
industry. The reputation, reliability and perceived technical competence of a 
construction  firm  are  highly  correlated  to  its  size.  In  construction,  critical 
mass is important in particular with respect to large and complex projects as 
they  necessitate  significant  financial,  technological  and  human  resources 



























        Horizontal  Vertical  Lateral 
        N=62          N=30                 N=14         
Targets         
Event window  CAAR    Median   Positve  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive 
[-20;+20]  17.54% ***  17.59% ***  83.87%  26.46% ***  17.50% *** 90.00%  24.92% ***  25.23% *  85.71% 
[-10;+10]  14.97% ***  12.17% ***  79.03%  21.30% ***  15.14% *** 86.67%  22.18% ***  24.36% *  85.71% 
[-5;+5]  11.02% ***  9.89% ***  72.58%  20.98% ***  13.10% *** 86.67%  20.63% ***  24.92% ** 92.86% 
[-1;+1]  9.70% ***  6.86% ***  83.87%  16.15% ***  10.28% *** 90.00%  15.92% ***  20.37% *  85.71% 
Acquirers                                        
Event window  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive 
[-20;+20]  1.46%   -0.05%   50.00%  4.93%   5.34% *** 73.33%  -6.80%   -9.87% *  28.57% 
[-10;+10]  -0.04%   -0.32%   48.39%  3.72%   1.83% **  70.00%  -1.93%   -0.69%   50.00% 
[-5;+5]  -0.87%   -0.59% *  46.77%  3.23%   1.98% **  70.00%  -0.78%   -1.10%   35.71% 
[-1;+1]  0.37%     0.54% **  58.06%  2.67%     1.71% **  70.00%  -1.00%     -1.16%    35.71% 
Combined Entity                                    
Event window  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive  CAAR    Median   Positive 
[-20;+20]  4.65% ***  1.96% ***  61.29%  6.88% ***  6.42% *** 73.33%  -1.91%   -4.27%   42.86% 
[-10;+10]  3.17% ***  4.22% ***  58.06%  5.71% ***  4.10% *** 83.33%  1.73%   2.28%   57.14% 
[-5;+5]  2.22% ***  1.27% ***  59.68%  5.02% ***  2.98% *** 76.67%  2.24%   1.50%   64.29% 
[-1;+1]  3.03% ***  1.92% ***  70.97%  4.45% ***  3.07% *** 80.00%  1.99%     1.93%    71.43% 
Note: This table summarizes the averages and medians of the CAR of 106 targets, acquirers and combined entities in the construction industry world 
wide, which were involved in an M&A transaction in the period from 1986 to 2006. *, **, *** indicates the statistical significance to the 10%, 
5% and 1%-levels. Positive expresses the percentage of firms with a positive CAR in the sample. 
Table 8  Subsample Analysis According to the Business Focus 
 
 

































Table 9  Overview Probable Success Determinants 
Strategy related determinants  Variables 
(D1) Activity focus  (V1) Horizontal 
    (V2) Vertical 
    (V3) Lateral 
(D2) Geographical focus  (V4) National vs. cross-border 
(D3) Relative size  (V5) Turnover target / turnover acquirer 
Selection related determinants  Variables 
(D4) Rel. return on capital employed  (ROCE) (V6) ROCE target / ROCE acquirer 
Financing related determinants  Variables 
(D5) Gearing  (V7) Net debt to equity ratio acquirer 
(D6) Cash balance ratio  (V8) Cash to total assets ratio acquirer 
Payment related determinant  Variable 
(D7) Method of payment  (V9) Cash vs. share deal 
 
 
Vertical  M&A  transactions  which  gained  higher  importance  over  the  last 
years and are of main interest in this examination are most often motivated by 
the generation of cross-selling synergies. Industrial companies and services 
providers  are  concentrating  on  their  core  competencies  which  lead  to  an 
increasing demand of external complete solutions with respect to real estate 
infrastructure needs. These needs can more easily be conceived and provided 
by vertically integrated construction firms as they have direct access to the 
necessary know how and resources (Kepler & Greenwood, 2007).  
 
The increasing popularity of public private partnerships (PPP) also contributes 
to the attractiveness of expanding the construction value chain as PPP projects 
regularly  involve  the  financing,  design,  construction,  operation  and 
maintenance of public facilities (Li et al., 2005). Construction companies hope 
to  profit  from  the  extension  of  the  value  chain  forwards  into  real  estate 
services  because  these  services  typically  carry  a  higher  margin  and  lower 
operational risk. Furthermore, service revenues are generally recurrent as they 
are often based on long-term contracts. However, it remains an open question 
whether  construction  companies  are  able  to  generate  shareholder  value  by 
vertical acquisitions for their owners. Only if construction companies are able 
to exploit synergies which might result from this extension of the value chain, 
this vertical consolidation trend can be considered as economically effective. 
Cross-industry M&A studies often explain lateral acquisition strategies with 
personal  objectives  of  the  management,  e.g.  the  volition  to  increase  their 
sphere  of  influence  or  the  wish  to  secure  their  own  job  in  case  of  an 
underperformance of the existing business (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). We especially expect to find an indication for the 
existence  of  cross-selling  synergies  which  can  be  generated  by  offering  a 
wider  and  complimentary  range  of  non  real  estate  related  services  to  the 



























(D2) Geographical Focus 
Rice (2006) argues that the primary motive for cross-border transactions is to 
lower the dependency on public spending and the state of the economy in the 
home market. However, the more complex integration of foreign companies 
and possible cultural conflicts can easily offset the benefits gained from a 
cross-border  diversification.  We  analyze  the  geographical  focus  of  the 
transaction by differentiating between national and cross-border transactions. 
A separate analysis of transcontinental acquisitions is not made due to the fact 
that the sample only contains 5 intercontinental deals.  
 
(D3) Relative Size 
If  the  overall  company  size  is  a  critical  success  factor  in  the  construction 
industry  (Hillebrandt  and  Cannon,  1990),  the  acquisition  of  larger  targets 
should  positively  influence  the  creation  of  shareholder  wealth.  Due  to  the 
project  driven  business  in  the  construction  industry  and  the  highly 
decentralized  organization  structures,  the  increase  in  complexity  when 
acquiring  very  large  targets  is  inferior  to  other  sectors,  e.g.  the  process 
industry where next to administrative processes, a multitude of operational 
processes need to be harmonized in order to realize synergy potentials.  
 
 (D4) Relative Return on Capital Employed 
According to the efficiency hypothesis, M&A transactions are carried out in 
case  that  existing  resources,  client  contacts  and  corporate  development 
possibilities  are  inefficiently  utilized  by  the  management  of  the  target 
company. An exchange of the management team and/or the implementation of 
improved  processes  by  the  acquirer  can  then  contribute  to  a  significant 
appreciation of the target company. The efficiency hypothesis assumes that 
the acquirer firms are more efficient and more profitable than the target firms.  
 
The efficiency hypothesis is tested based on the explanatory variable relative 
ROCE.  ROCE  measures the overall efficiency of the capital invested in a 
company  irrespective  of  its  specific  financing  structure.  The  variable 
compares the ROCE of the target firm to that of the acquirer in the year prior 
to the announcement of the M&A transaction. 
 
(D5) Gearing 
According to the free cash-flow hypothesis developed by Jensen (1986), one 
major cause of takeover activity is the existence of agency costs linked to 
conflicts between managers and shareholders over the payout of free cash-
flows. Instead of paying out free cash-flows in form of dividends or share 
buy-backs,  management  might  be  tempted  to  retain  earnings  within  the 
company, even in cases where presently only investments with negative net 

































free cash flows is an increase of the gearing of a company (Jensen, 1986). The 
gearing measures the amount of net debt/net cash of a company in relation to 
its equity. 
 
(D6) Cash Balance Ratio 
The free cash-flow hypothesis can also be examined by the cash balance ratio 
of the acquirer as it gives an indication to which extend free cash has not been 
employed in order to pay out dividends or repurchase shares. Harford (1999) 
documents  evidence  that  cash-rich  firms  are  more  likely  to  attempt 
acquisitions and that these acquisitions are on average, value decreasing. 
 
 (D7) Method of Payment 
Previous empirical research that studied the role of the method of payment in 
explaining  abnormal  returns  to  acquiring  firms  documents  significant 
differences between cash and stock transactions.  Asquith et al. (1983) and 
Brown and Ryngaert (1991) show that returns to bidders in stock acquisitions 
are  overall  significantly  negative  and  not  significant  in  cash  transactions. 
These empirical findings are mainly explained by signaling  arguments.  As 
described by Myers and Majluf (1984), acquirers tend to employ own stock to 
finance an M&A transaction when they perceive their stock to be currently 
overvalued (Yook, 2003). 
 
 
6.  Regression Results 
 
The  preceding  sections  have  introduced  a  number  of  probable  success 
determinants. In Table 10, these explanatory variables are tested based on a 
linear regression analysis for the event window [-1; +1]. In order to derive the 
regression model, the backward elimination variable selection procedure has 
been applied. Table 10 depicts the outcome of the analyses. 
 
The Durbin-Watson indicator as well as the variance inflation factor indicate 
that the regression models do not suffer from autocorrelations. As stated in 
Table 10, the elimination procedure leads to the immediate removal of 2 out 
of a total of 8 explanatory variables. The relative ROCE (Var6) as well as the 
method of payment (Var9) do not contribute to the explanation of the total 
variance of the CAR. Also, the vertical transactions of the variables (Var2), 
lateral transactions (Var3), geographical focus (Var4) and cash balance ratio 
acquirer (Var8) remain statistically insignificant, while the relative size of the 
transaction  (Var5)  and  the  gearing  of  the  acquirer  (Var7)  both  have  a 

















































(Var2)  (Var3)  (Var4)  (Var5)  (Var6)  (Var7)  (Var8)  (Var9) 
1  106 
2,6%*  0.0011  0.1600*               
(2.723)  (0.140)  (1.653)               
                       
2  106 
5,1%***  0.1840    -2.4500***             
(6.646)  (4.846)    (2.578)             
                       
3  106 
1.1%  0.0052      0.0400           
(0.126)  (0.279)      (0.355)           
                       
4  85 
2,7%*  0.0084        0.1970*         
(3.340)  (1.038)        (1.828)         
                       
5  85 
1.2%  0.0121          0.0130       
(0.014)  (1.504)          (0.120)       
                       
6  104 
3,7%**  0.0066            0.2140*     
(4.915)  (0.956)            (2.217)     
                       
7  104 
0.7%  0.0049              0.0500   
(0.252)  (0.397)              (0.502)   
                       
(Continues…) 
Table 10  Results of the Multivariate Regression Model [-1; +1] 
 
























































(Var2)  (Var3)  (Var4)  (Var5)  (Var6)  (Var7)  (Var8)  (Var9) 
8  85 
1.1%  0.0061                0.0320 
(0.084)  (0.421)                (0.290) 
                       
9  81 
6.5%*  -0.014  0.110  -0.109  0.054  0.207*    2.499**  0.131   
(1.924)  (-0.668)  (0.972)  (-0,955)  (0.483)  (1,863)    (2.263)  (1,160)   
                       
10  81 
7.4%**  -0.006  0.111  -0.105    0.198*    0.251**  0.123   
(2.285)  (-0.471)  (0.987)  (-0.927)    (1.819)    (2.294)  (1.103)   
                       
11  81 
7.6%**  -0.010  0.137      0.205*    0.258**  0.106   
(2.647)  (-0.764)  (1.264)      (1.882)    (2.358)  (0.969)   
                       
12  81 
7.7%**  -0.002  0.139      0.216**    0.240**     
(3.218)  (-0.205)  (1.287)      (1.998)    (2.229)     
                       
13  81 
6.9%**  0.004        0.201*    0.231**     
(3.967)  (0.514)        (1.863)    (2.138)     
                       
Durbin-Watson  2.097      Maximum VIF of the explanatory variables 1.098   
Note: This table summarizes the results of the multivariate linear regression model for the event window [-1; +1]. *, **, *** indicates the statistical 
significance to the 10%, 5% and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 



























Vertical transactions (Var2) do not provide shareholders with superior M&A 
success.  We  interpret  this  observation  as  an  indicator  that  construction 
companies are not able to exploit synergy potential which is not given to other 
service providers along the real estate life cycle. Obviously, capital market 
participants are skeptical about the abilities of construction companies to offer 
better services to real estate users than the separated market-oriented business 
units. 
 
Instead, we find support for one construction-industry specific and one very 
general  factor  that  explain  the  M&A  performance:  the  relative  size  of  the 
target positively influences the success of M&A transactions. We interpret 
this  finding  as  support  for  the  idea  that  the  overall  size  of  a  construction 
company is helpful to signal reputation, reliability and technical competence. 
Acquisitions  aimed  to  rapidly  increase  the  overall  size  of  a  construction 
company can thus contribute to the creation of shareholder wealth. Due to the 
project  driven  business  in  the  construction  industry  and  the  highly 
decentralized  organization  structures,  the  increase  in  complexity  by  the 
acquisition of large targets is smaller than other sectors. As the significant 
impact of the gearing of acquirer firms has shown the existence of agency 
conflicts in the construction industry with regard to the efficient usage of free 
cash flows is likely, an increase of the financial leverage of a construction 
company  is  thus  likely  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  management  attitude 
towards the pursuit of value-enhancing M&A transactions.  
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
From an overall perspective, M&A transactions in the construction industry 
are  clearly  value  enhancing.  Consistent  to  prior  empirical  research  in  this 
industry, the announcement of M&A transactions  generates highly positive 
capital  market  reactions  for  the  shareholders  of  the  target  firms.  The 
shareholders of bidder companies also slightly benefit from the acquisitions. 
This finding is in line with former evidence for the construction industry by 
Choi and Russel (2004).  
 
If  capital  markets  would  perceive  construction  companies  to  be  superior 
facility managers, then vertical acquisitions along the real estate value chain 
should  result  in  significant  positive  announcement  returns.  However,  our 
regression  analyses  show  that  the  focus  on  vertical  acquisitions  does  not 
significantly contribute to M&A success. We interpret this observation as an 
indicator that construction companies are not able to exploit synergy potential 
which is not given to other service providers along the real estate life cycle. 
Instead, we find support for one construction-industry specific and one very 
general factor that explain M&A performance: 

































Relative size and gearing significantly contribute to the explanation of M&A 
success. The relative size of the target positively influences the success of 
M&A transactions. This finding supports the idea that the overall size of a 
construction company is one of the most important indicators of its reputation, 
reliability and technical competence. Acquisitions aimed to rapidly increase 
the overall size of a construction company can thus contribute to the creation 
of shareholder wealth. The significant impact of the gearing of acquirer firms 
has shown the existence of agency conflicts in the construction industry with 
regard to the efficient usage of free cash flows is likely. An increase of the 
financial leverage of a construction company is thus likely to have a positive 
impact  on  management  commitment  towards  the  pursuit  of  only  value-
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